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Abstract:   
 
This paper summarizes progress made in a DfID-funded World Bank initiative to test and 
develop policy-relevant, politically acceptable, quantitative indicators of governance.  
There are two major components involved in the process of generating indicators that are 
practical means of reform.  Political acceptability is key in developing neutral 
quantitative benchmarks of good governance that can be embraced by reformers.  In 
addition to political acceptability, measuring governance must be comprehensive and 
institutionally specific so that reformers know which institutions to reform and how to do 
so.  This paper explores some of the most promising second generation indicators of good 
governance and elaborates on how they are being used in World Bank operations.   
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 2. 
 
This paper summarizes some modest but significant progress within a project that seeks 
to lower the temperature on a key question in governance: ‗how can it be measured in a 
way that promotes constructive change?‘   
 
Important work at the World Bank and other institutions in the first generation of 
governance indicators helped to draw attention to the importance of governance.  
Assessments of these indicators are shown in initial research to be associated with a wide 
variety of development outcomes (Ades and DiTella 1996;  Chong and Calderon 1999;  
Hall and Jones 1999;  Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998;  Kaufmann, 
Mehrez, and Schmukler 1999;  Knack and Keefer 1997;  Mauro 1995;  Rodrik 1997;  
Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Wei 1997).  With the help of the Department for International 
Development, United Kingdom (DfID), the World Bank started work in the Fall of 2000 
on the development of institutionally specific and transparently generated governance and 
corruption indicators.   
 
The work has been undertaken in collaboration with the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD.  The DAC has been working to establish indicators that 
measure movement towards the meeting of major UN conference goals since the early 
1990s.  In "Shaping the 21
st
 Century:  The Contribution to Development Cooperation" 
(OECD 1996) the DAC confirmed the goals and set out the areas of democratic 
governance that it saw as essential for achieving these goals.  These areas are good 
governance (including public sector management, rule of law, corruption and military 
expenditure); human rights; democratization and participatory development.  In 1996, the 
DAC ad hoc working group reported that it had failed to forge a consensus around some 
core indicators for these issues.   
 
Demand for measurements of progress increased significantly, particularly from the 
development agencies, and a DAC proposal to a joint OECD/UN/World Bank meeting on 
Agreed Indicators of Development Progress in February 1998 re-launched the process.  
However, at the Joint UN/OECD/World Bank/IMF International Development Forum 
hosted by OECD/DAC in March 2000, there was again a consensus that there was not yet 
a meaningful set of indicators of participatory democracy and good governance that was 
politically acceptable to governments.  Nevertheless, there was strong sentiment that 
disciplined work on identifying meaningful and acceptable indicators should continue, as 
it was recognized that the alternative was the increasing use (at least outside DAC) of 
indicators that were non-transparent and/or unacceptable to governments.    
 
Table 1 provides details of the areas in which the DAC and others have facilitated 
consensus on measurable development goals and indicators of those goals.  These goals 
are referred to collectively as the Millennium Development Goals.   
 3. 
Table 1:  Measuring Development Progress: A Working Set of Core Outcomes 
 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
GOALS AND TARGETS INDICATORS 
GOAL 1: ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER 
Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people whose income is less 
than one dollar a day 
1. Proportion of population below $1 per day 
2. Poverty gap ratio [incidence x depth of poverty] 
3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption 
Target 2:  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
4. Prevalence of underweight children (under-five years of age) 
5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy 
consumption 
GOAL 2: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION 
Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, 
boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a 
full course of primary schooling 
6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education 
7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 
8. Literacy rate of 15-24 year olds 
GOAL 3: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN 
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education preferably by 2005 and 
to all levels of education no later than 2015 
 
 
9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education 
10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15-24 year olds 
11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector 
12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament 
GOAL 4: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY 
Target 5:  Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 
2015,  the under-five mortality rate 
13. Under-five mortality rate 
14. Infant mortality rate 
15. Proportion of 1 year old children immunised against measles 
GOAL 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH 
Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 
2015, the maternal mortality ratio 
16. Maternal mortality ratio 
17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel 
GOAL 6: COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES 
Target 7: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, 
the spread of HIV/AIDS 
18. HIV prevalence among 15-24 year old pregnant women  
19. Contraceptive prevalence rate 
20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS 
Target 8: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, 
the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases 
21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria  
22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective 
malaria prevention and treatment measures 
23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis 
24. Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS (Directly 
Observed Treatment Short Course) 
GOAL 7: ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and 
programmes and reverse the loss of 
environmental resources 
25. Proportion of land area covered by forest 
26. Land area protected to maintain biological diversity 
27. GDP per unit of energy use (as proxy for energy efficiency)  
28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) 
[Plus two figures of global atmospheric pollution: ozone depletion 
and the accumulation of global warming gases] 
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water 
29. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved 
water source 
Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers 
30. Proportion of people with access to improved sanitation 
31. Proportion of people with access to secure tenure 
[Urban/rural disaggregation of several of the above indicators may 
be relevant for monitoring improvement in the lives of slum 
dwellers] 
GOAL 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT* 
Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, 
predictable, non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system  
 
 Includes a commitment to good governance, 
development, and poverty reduction – both 
nationally and internationally 
Some of the indicators listed below will be monitored separately for 
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked 
countries and small island developing states. 
Official Development Assistance 
32. Net ODA as percentage of DAC donors’ GNI [targets of 0.7% in 
total and 0.15% for LDCs] 
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Target 13: Address the Special Needs of the Least 
Developed Countries 
 
 Includes: tariff and quota free access for LDC 
exports; enhanced programme of debt relief 
for HIPC and cancellation of official bilateral 
debt; and more generous ODA for countries 
committed to poverty reduction 
 
Target 14: Address the Special Needs of landlocked 
countries and small island developing states 
 
 (through Barbados Programme and 22nd 
General Assembly provisions) 
 
Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems 
of developing countries through national and 
international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long term  
33. Proportion of ODA to basic social services (basic education, 
primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) 
34. Proportion of ODA that is untied 
35. Proportion of ODA for environment in small island developing 
states 
36. Proportion of ODA for transport sector in land-locked countries 
 
Market Access 
37. Proportion of exports (by value and excluding arms) admitted free 
of duties and quotas 
38. Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural products and textiles and 
clothing 
39. Domestic and export agricultural subsidies in OECD countries 
40. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity  
 
Debt Sustainability 
41. Proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt cancelled 
42. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services 
43. Proportion of ODA provided as debt relief 
44. Number of countries reaching HIPC decision and completion 
points 
Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, 
develop and implement strategies for decent 
and productive work for youth 
45. Unemployment rate of 15-24 year olds 
Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies, provide access to affordable, 
essential drugs in developing countries 
46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs 
on a sustainable basis     
Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available the benefits of new technologies, 
especially information and communications 
47. Telephone lines per 1000 people 
48. Personal computers per 1000 people 
 
Other Indicators TBD 
 
Source: United Nations 
Note that the selection of indicators for Goals 7 and 8 is subject to further refinement. 
 
The intention of this project is to initiate a debate that might lead to consensus on some 
governance indicators that potentially can be added to the existing UN indicators 
contained in the Millennium Development Goals.   
 
The Political Acceptability of Governance Indicators 
 
The term ―second generation governance indicators‖ has been introduced since the 
launch of the project to convey the degree to which the project seeks to build on and 
complement an earlier generation of work.  That work was valuable in focusing on the 
initial inquiry of the relationships between governance and development.  The first 
generation of governance indicators has helped to draw attention to the right issues, but 
the proliferation of first generation governance indicators has been accompanied by 
neither improved insight into practical reforms nor provided any greater traction on 
reform targets.  The interrelated problems that these first generation indicators face is that 
they lack specificity and face intrinsic problems with political acceptability.   
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If consensus is key to developing 
governance indicators that offer traction 
in institutional change, then careful 
testing of the water and sensitivity to the 
often justified concerns of governments 
is foremost in building that consensus.  
The project has approached the task of 
developing political acceptability and 
professional consensus on some 
quantitative measures of governance 
indicators cautiously.  The strategy 
reflects an assumption that some 
consensus on governance indicators 
could assist in furthering productive 
reforms in two ways—creating both 
demand for and supply of key 
institutional reforms.  One ex ante way 
to anticipate and resolve governments' 
concerns is inherent in the design of the 
project.  To ameliorate political and 
specificity problems to the extent 
possible, the second generation governance indicators project has embraced specific 
criteria that indicators must meet (Box 1).  The criteria serve to ensure that indicators are 
(a) politically acceptable;  (b) suitable for rigorous quantitative analyses;  and, (c) 
operationally relevant.  In this manner, the project is one of a set of developments within 
the World Bank that are, broadly, leading in the same direction.   
 
A second ex ante mechanism for recognizing and addressing political concerns and 
potential objections is through the use of an open discussion forum consisting of an 
interactive web-based discourse through the OECD DAC web site.  Each indicator posted 
on the site is accompanied by a discussion of how the indicator is constructed, what it 
intends to measure, and a preliminary assessment of the extent to which it meets the 
criteria for second generation governance indicators set out in Box 1.  The discussion 
group consists of a separate discussion for each proposed indicator or set of related 
indicators, so that specific details related to individual indicators can be addressed.  The 
institutionalized feedback in the form of comments and discussion during the creation of 
indicators provides the capability to design measures that incorporate suggestions to 
address specific concerns.  By anticipating concerns and objections, it is hoped that 
consensus can be reached to the extent possible.   
 
Overall, the project has identified significant datasets for 40 of these 87 candidate 
indicators, and has posted 23 on the DAC website.  The data sets consist of anywhere 
from 29 to 168 countries, but the mean number of countries for the data sets is 80 
countries.  Initial investigations have been conducted into the associations between the 
more promising second generation indicators and the OECD DAC Millennium 
Development Goals. 
 
Box 1 Four criteria for second generation 
governance indicators 
1. Generated through a transparent process. 
Proposed indicators should be replicable through 
a well documented process. Furthermore, the data 
should come from sources that are politically 
acceptable.  
2. Available across many countries. Most important 
of these countries are developing countries.  
Broad  country coverage is necessary for testing 
relationships between indicators and valued 
outcomes.   It is hoped that an institutionalized 
procedure should either be in place or could 
reasonably be set up to collect data on the 
proposed indicator in the future. 
3. Of high quality and accurate. Indicators should 
be measured in a consistent manner across 
countries, and values should reflect what the 
indicator purports to measure.  
4. Specific.  Indicators should measure either  a 
particular set of governance institutions or a 
defined output, and should not be unduly affected 
by forces exogenous to the aspect of government 
it is trying to capture.  
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Thus far, the project has examined 84 candidate indicators that meet the specified criteria 
in Box 1.  The key stages in the project have been  
1. Consultation with institutional specialists 
2. Refinement of the methodological approach 
3. Internal review  
4. Construction of initial data sets 
5. Development of an interactive website with the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee 
6. Piloting approach in South East Europe 
 
Governance Defined 
 
The project has taken a commonsensical, but theoretically defensible, view of the 
dimensions of governance, although thus far the project has focused on the executive.  
Broadly speaking, indicators either measure constraints on the executive related to 
accountability, or measure the administrative capabilities of executives.  Following 
Diamond's work, constraints on the executive are from one of four directions:  formal 
horizontal, informal horizontal, inter-governmental vertical, or vertical checks from the 
electorate.  Indicators of administrative capabilities are either process indicators that 
measure the institutional composition of the executive, e.g., civil service wages relative to 
private sector wages, or performance indicators of outputs such as budgetary volatility or  
quality of service delivery.  Box 2 summarizes the areas in which the project has looked 
for promising second generation candidates. 
 
Although the initial focus of the project is on the executive, there are plans to widen the 
scope of what is meant by governance as a result of discussions held during a workshop 
at the World Bank to discuss second generation indicators.  The workshop discussions 
flagged several areas in which the current work can be extended, including the possibility 
of teaming up with partner organizations with broader mandates in the area of 
governance.  Now that the ―second generation‖ process has been established, a proposal 
will also be made to request parallel funding for one or more other organizations with the 
explicit requirement that they would follow the ―second generation‖ methodology – with 
the expectation that they might apply it to a broader set of candidate indicators.  This 
extension would enable attention to be paid to issues of participatory government, 
democratization, and human rights.   
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Box 2 Governance Dimensions reviewed for “Second Generation” Governance Indicators 
 
Executive Constraints 
Formal Horizontal 
 Accountability to the legislature (e.g., as measured by timeliness and comprehensiveness of audit 
reports to the legislature, the degree to which the enacted budget was followed, or measures of 
―grand‖ corruption/state capture including purchase of legislation) 
 Accountability to the courts (e.g., percent of the population that has litigated against executive 
entity (including police) in past 5 years, or percentage of litigants reporting case resolved in a 
timely manner) 
Informal Horizontal 
 Media freedom 
 Civil service professionalism (e.g., political appointees in the civil service, measures of 
meritocratic appointments) 
 Competitive private sector (e.g., concentration of power) 
Inter-governmental Vertical 
 Budgetary autonomy of sub-national government (e.g., share of expenditures, share of revenues, 
tax share) 
Vertical Checks from the Electorate 
 Education and literacy 
 Breadth of tax base 
 
Executive Capabilities 
Process 
 Planning and budget preparation (e.g., fiscal planning, revenue predictability and stability, tax 
simplicity, budgetary rigidity) 
 Fiscal weight of public employment (e.g., central government wage bill/GDP) 
 Budget execution (e.g., cash flow by spending units, average deviation in spending units) 
 Civil service incentives (e.g., vertical and horizontal compression) 
 Civil service numbers 
 Intergovernmental relations (e.g., predictability and transparency of transfers and frequency of 
rule changes for transfers) 
 Revenue administration (e.g., mechanisms for taxpayer/third party participation in revenue policy 
formation) 
Performance 
 For businesses (e.g., budgetary volatility, policy unpredictability, predictable judiciary, economic 
neutrality of taxation, contract intensive money, business start-up costs, number of independent 
procedural actions to start a business) 
 For tax payers (e.g., equity, certainty, compliance costs) 
 For litigants (e.g., number of independent procedural actions to collect an overdue debt, number 
of independent procedural actions needed to evict a tenant) 
 For citizens (e.g., public respect for government employees, public perceptions of corruption in 
the civil service, percent of population fearful of crime) 
 For service recipients (e.g., quality of service delivery, frequency of power outages) 
 
 
There are quite a number of second generation indicators for which data are already 
available.  To provide illustration, we examine the rationale and expectations 
underpinning three representative indicators in some detail.  Of course, all governance 
indicators in this project have theoretical underpinnings, despite our only examining a 
few of them here.   
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The timeliness of audited financial statements is defined as the elapsed time between the 
end of the financial year and the tabling of externally audited financial statements in the 
legislature.  The rationale for this indicator is that the executive should be held 
accountable by the legislature for its fiscal management and underlying policy actions.  
Timeliness of financial reporting is an important aspect of good financial management 
practice. Lack of timeliness may reflect either or both delays in preparing the financial 
statements for audit or delays in auditing the statements.  However, there are many other 
important aspects of audit performance that cannot be reflected in this or any other single 
measure, but this indicator should provide baseline information about one of the 
conditions necessary for effective audits, and the measure can be calculated from 
information provided by the government.   
 
Contract intensive money is the proportion of the money supply that is not held in the 
form of currency, i.e. the proportion that is held in bank accounts and as other financial 
assets.  The percentage of contract intensive money indicates in part how much faith 
investors have in the government's ability and willingness to enforce financial contracts, 
and to refrain from expropriating financial assets.  It is a measure of trust in banks and in 
the government.  Contract intensive money is calculated as one minus the ratio of 
currency outside of banks to the sum of money and quasi-money (one minus line 14a 
divided by the sum of lines 34 and 35 in the IFS).  Data used to construct the measure of 
contract intensive money are regularly updated for countries included in the International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook.  Data are available for almost all countries, over long 
periods of time.   
 
Reliance on revenue from international trade taxes is widely believed to reflect weak 
administrative capacity.  Economic theory suggests that taxing all transactions at low or 
moderate levels is more efficient than collecting taxes from only a subset of transactions 
at high rates.  However, collecting income, sales or other taxes on a broad range of 
transactions requires a certain degree of administrative capability on the part of 
governments.  It is relatively easy for governments to collect tax revenues from cross-
border transactions, because they are more easily monitored.  International trade taxes 
revenues reflect other influences in addition to administrative capacity.  They can be 
affected by trade policies.  For example, non-tariff barriers can reduce trade tax revenues 
by reducing imports.  Higher tariffs intended to protect domestic producers will tend to 
reduce trade tax revenues by reducing import volumes, but for given import volumes 
higher rates will increase revenues.  Also, in general the smaller the country, the larger 
the share of its transactions that will take place across national borders.  It is possible to 
adjust for these influences, for example by calculating the deviation of international trade 
tax revenues from the value that would be expected based on country size.  Data for 
international trade tax revenues are regularly updated for countries included in the GFS, 
and data on international trade taxes as a percentage of all central government revenues is 
available in the World Bank's World Development Indicators.   
 
Some preliminary analysis of the candidate indicators and their association with pro-poor 
development outcomes has begun.  Generally, this work requires tests of the robustness 
of any relationship controlling for other factors that might independently influence 
progress towards achieving the development goals.  It will also explore the possibility 
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that some relationships are nonlinear, and that some may be sensitive to a small number 
of outlying observations.   
 
Second Generation Governance Indicators' Relevance to Development Outcomes 
 
Recently, the relationship between five of the second generation indicators of good 
governance and the DAC‘s Millennium Development Goals has been empirically 
analyzed (Kugler 2001).  Preliminary analyses, using second generation indicators for 
which the data are available, have produced some promising results.  There are 
statistically significant relationships between some candidate indicators and many pro-
poor outcomes such as lower infant mortality.   
 
An absence of a relationship sometimes can be equally informative.  For example, there 
is little evidence in the cross-country data to support the belief that raising civil service 
pay will help to achieve any of the development goals.  Of course, this finding does not 
mean that raising pay is never a good idea; rather, it merely suggests caution in urging it 
as a one-size-fits-all policy.        
 
Table 2 provides details for indicators where progress has been made with regard to data 
collection, dissemination, or their relationship to the indicators of the DAC development 
goals.   
 
Table 2:  Second Generation Indicators and Development Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
Association with Development 
Outcomes 
Indicator 
# of 
Countries 
Data on 
Website 
Not 
Associated 
Linear 
Association 
Non-linear 
Association 
Formal Horizontal      
1.  Delays in Auditing NA     
2.  "Grand" Corruption/ State Capture 22     
Informal Horizontal      
3.  Freedom House Civil Liberties Score 188     
4.  Political Appointees in "Top Levels 
of" Civil Service 
35 
    
5.  Meritocratic Civil Service 35     
Inter-Governmental Vertical      
6.  Sub-national Share of Expenditures 100     
7.  Sub-national Share of Revenues 101     
8.  Vertical Imbalance 93     
9.  Sub-national Expenditures as Share 
of GDP 
99 
    
10.  Sub-national Revenues as Share of 
GDP 
98 
    
11.  Tax Share 94     
Vertical Checks from the Electorate      
12.  Literacy Rate 133     
13.  Primary School Continuing 
Enrolment Rate 
131 
    
Process Indicators      
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14.  Central Government Wage Bill/GDP 104     
15.  Central Government Wage 
Bill/Government Expenditure 
47 
    
16.  Civil Service Pay (Vertical 
Compression) 
30 
    
17.  Average Government Wage to Per 
Capita GDP 
94 
    
18.  Average Government Wage to 
Manufacturing Wage 
51 
    
19.  Average Government Wage to 
Financial Sector Wage 
39 
    
20.  Average Government Wage to 
Private Sector Wage 
29 
    
21.  Central Government Excluding 
Education, Health, and if Available, 
Policy (% Population) 
99 
    
22.  Subnational Government Excluding 
Education, Health, and if Available, 
Policy (% Population) 
78 
    
23.  Education Employees (% 
Population) 
96 
    
24.  Health Employees (% Population) 87     
25.  Police (% Population) 68     
26.  Armed Forces (% Population) 97     
27.  SOE Employees (% Population) 44     
28.  International Trade Taxes as % of 
Total Revenue 
122 
    
Performance Indicators      
29.  Budgetary Volatility 118     
30.  Policy Unpredictability (WDR 97) 66     
31.  Predictable Judiciary (WDR 97, 
q11) 
67 
    
32.  Crime and Theft as Obstacles to 
Conducting Business (Q9) 
67 
    
33.  Crime and Theft as Obstacles to 
Conducting Business (Street) 
22 
    
34.  Crime and Theft as Obstacles to 
Conducting Business (Organized) 
22 
    
35.  Contract Intensive Money (% of the 
Money Supply Held in Bank Accounts 
and as Other Financial Assets) 
152 
    
36.  Number of Independent Business 
Start-up Procedures  
85 
    
37.  Number of Independent Legal 
Actions to Evict Tenant 
105 
    
38.  Number of Independent Legal 
Actions to Collect Overdue Debt 
106 
    
39.  Enforcement of Property Rights 
(WDR97, q10) 
67 
    
40.  Respect for Government Employees 57     
41.  Public Perceptions of Corruption in 
the Civil Service 
57 
    
42.  % of Population Fearful of Crime 60     
43.  % of Population Expressing 
Confidence in State's Ability to Protect 
them from Crime 
60 
    
 11. 
44.  Quality of Service Delivered (index 
Q22) 
67 
    
45.  Quality of Service Delivered (Q25) 67     
46.  Frequency of Power Outages 67     
47.  Waiting Time for Telephone Line 169     
 
 
The basic empirical strategy is to test the relevance for development indicators against 
accepted development outcomes.  Future work will extend this analysis, and conduct 
similar analyses using many more second generation governance indicators, and more 
indicators of development outcomes.  To date, the indicator for budgetary volatility has 
been tested most comprehensively.   
 
Budgetary Volatility 
 
An important aspect of the quality of government policy is its coherence and 
predictability.  The budget is a key arena in which government policy issues are played 
out, resulting in executive spending decisions.  To the extent that policy decisions are 
captured in the budget, then stable policy should be reflected in stable budget allocations.  
Thus, one objective measure of policy coherence and predictability can be obtained from 
government expenditures data.  In most cases, large year-to-year fluctuations in 
expenditure shares would indicate an absence of a coherent and predictable (and hence 
accountable) government policy.  Unpredictable government policy can adversely affect 
business investment, as well as the behavior of public officials.  
 
Excessive volatility or incoherence undermines government credibility for businesses and 
other actors, reduces investor confidence and capital inflows, and slows economic 
growth.  The claim is not that businesses study the budget and its amendments, and alter 
their investment decisions accordingly.  Moreover, large changes at the levels of 
aggregation for which expenditure data are available may not necessarily reflect changes 
at finer levels that actually affect the profitability of businesses.  Any impact of budgetary 
volatility on investment is likely to reflect primarily the effects of unpredictable changes 
in laws and regulations that affect businesses but do not enter government budgets.  The 
assumption is that unpredictability in budgeting and in rulemaking are likely to be very 
highly correlated, as they are both the product of governments that face few effective 
accountability mechanisms.  This assumption is strongly supported by the finding that 
budgetary volatility is strongly correlated with alternative measures of policy 
unpredictability, that are based on expert ratings or business surveys.  The same countries 
that ―experts‖ or surveys judge to have volatile policy environments tend to be those with 
high values of budgetary volatility, even when per capita income is controlled for.  The 
advantage of budgetary volatility over these subjective measures with which it is 
correlated is that it is an objective measure directly affected by the actions of 
government, so raises fewer issues of political acceptability.   
 
Unpredictability of policy can influence the decisions of public officials, as well as 
investors.  In circumstances of high budgetary volatility, officials charged with 
implementation may not take seriously pronouncements regarding policy, because the 
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policy is likely to change.  Expectations concerning the future flow of budgetary and 
other resources are significant determinants of behavior.  Officials who doubt that the 
budget will be implemented as planned may have few reasons to implement policies 
vigorously and every reason to over-staff, as salaries will ultimately be paid even if 
program funds are reduced.   
 
Unpredictable policy can worsen poverty in several ways.  By deterring investment, it 
can reduce per capita incomes, relative to more predictable policy environments.  Poorer 
persons attempting to establish small businesses may be particularly harmed, because 
with few assets other than their labor it is more difficult for them than for wealthy 
investors to diversify across sectors of the economy – which is otherwise a rational 
response to unpredictable policies.  Finally, the poor are likely to be more dependent on 
public delivery of services such as health and education.  Where policy with respect to 
services is incoherent, and resources are less predictable, the quality of these services is 
likely to suffer.   
 
We calculate budgetary volatility as the median of the year to year changes in each of the 
14 functional classifications over the preceding 4 years, where budget changes are 
defined as the (absolute values of the) difference in expenditure shares (for each 
functional classification) from year n to year n+1, calculated as a proportion of the year n 
figure.   
 
Interpreting the measure requires some cautions.  Budgetary volatility carries a negative 
connotation if we assume that the budget should be a credible signal of government‘s 
policy intentions and that in consequence radical variations indicate the absence of a 
coherent set of policy priorities.  However, in reality of course volatility may 
occasionally reflect shifts from an inefficient to an efficient set of allocations, e.g. 
following removal of a corrupt government, or even rational reallocations to meet macro-
fiscal objectives.  Examination of the most volatile cases in the data, however, does not 
suggest that in practice this obscures the message that high volatility is undesirable.  For 
example, there appear to be few if any cases where high volatility was produced by large 
shifts away from military spending toward spending on health, education, and social 
services.  Conceivably, extremely low values for this measure could reflect a budget 
process that is too rigid and which does not respond to changes in needs and preferences.  
However, as the lowest values belong to developed countries, such as the US and 
Australia, that are generally considered to be quite democratic with sound public 
expenditure management practices, it appears that ―excessive consistency‖ of this sort is 
rarely a problem in practice.   
 
Consistent with the hypothesis that budgetary volatility can make poor people worse off, 
countries with higher budgetary volatility also tend to have higher rates of infant 
mortality.  Figure 1 illustrates this relationship.   
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Figure 1 Budgetary volatility and infant mortality 
 
 
 
Budgetary volatility is also correlated with poor performance in meeting several other of 
the Millennium Development Goals, including the percentage of children who reach 
grade 5 in school, and widespread access to safe water.  The latter relationship illustrates 
the importance of possible nonlinearities and influential observations.  As depicted in the 
figure below, there is little systematic variation in variation in access to safe water among 
nations with volatility values that are below .3.  However, the only two nations above this 
threshold, Madagascar and Zaire, are among the only three countries in which less than 
30% of the population has access to safe water.   
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Figure 2 Budgetary volatility and access to safe water 
 
 
 
 
Operational Relevance 
 
In addition to their empirical relationship to development outcomes, second generation 
indicators are operationally relevant.  This is largely because of the effort to design them 
to be institutionally specific.  The next stage of the project took South East Europe as a 
pilot region to assess the feasibility of gathering sufficient data to construct governance 
scorecards. Representatives from the Stability Pact Anti-corruption Initiative (SPAI) and 
Bank staff working with them became interested in the second generation indicators as a 
relevant operational tool.  World Bank economic and sector work on the Balkans 
countries was comprehensively reviewed to gather information to construct the 
indicators.  The World Bank has been collaborating extensively with the OECD/SIGMA 
in developing indicators for the SPAI pillar on good governance, and in June 2001 a joint 
World Bank/SIGMA mission to the region sought data directly from governments.   
 
The work in the Balkans has provided an indication that governmental transparency with 
regard to data collection and dissemination are associated with accountability of the 
governance process, and that this can be measured by the number of candidate second 
generation indicators for which data are available in a specific country.  Although data 
are available for only the Balkans countries that are participating in the SPAI, initial 
evidence seems to indicate that accountability is associated with pro-poor outcomes.   
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Second generation governance indicators are also being implemented in operational work 
in Nigeria.  The World Bank is currently preparing a Community and Local Government 
Development Project (CLGDP) with an anticipated approval in July 2002.  This Specific 
Investment Loan totaling $100 million is currently under preparation.  The objective of 
the project will be to establish a viable, sustainable and transparent institutional 
mechanism for transferring investment resources to local governments and communities 
in order to enable them to finance their own development priorities.   
 
The CLGDP team will consult on some draft indicators with government officials and 
communities in the course of project preparation. Initial consultation will also lead to a 
smaller number of tightly focused indicators that are seen as critical to assessing Local 
Government Authority (LGA) readiness.  Such practical, relatively easily-
comprehensible indicators will facilitate not only the assessment process itself but also 
widespread publicity measures that inform stakeholders (particularly the public) in 
participating states, thereby supporting demand for good performance.  Another 
important task for the CLGDP team will be to explore the types of responsibilities and 
powers that will serve as effective and appropriate incentives for LGAs that demonstrate 
qualitative improvement.   
 
Another operational program where second generation governance indicators are featured 
prominently is in Cambodia.  The key role of second generation indicators in Cambodia 
is as a means of monitoring and evaluating reform programs as a part of a new strategy 
for coordinating donor assistance, the Governance Action Plan (GAP).  The goal of the 
GAP is to resolve potential conflicts and redundancies among different tasks, and permit 
governments, civil society organizations, and donors to monitor progress on multiple 
reform fronts according to a set of consensual, realistic, and transparent criteria for 
tracking reform implementation and impact.  Indicators serve as the benchmarks to 
monitor and evaluate the performance of reform.  Because the benchmarks are so 
prominent, their usefulness is meaningful only to the extent that they are objective and 
transparent to the eyes of all stakeholders involved.   
 
Within the GAP for Cambodia, indicators serve in two roles.  As impact indicators, they 
measure the extent to which a set of reform actions make an impact on administrative and 
governance structures in respective reform areas.  Second generation indicators such as 
civil service employment numbers, average wages of civil service employees, and salary 
compression figures are useful.  The second role of second generation indicators is as 
performance indicators, which measure changes in governance and the performance of 
the public sector.  Indicators such as the level of corruption, accountability of the 
government, and the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery are useful.   
 
Finally, second generation governance indicators are being used to address public 
administration reforms in Albania.  The Government of Albania has adopted a 
comprehensive policy reform program to strengthen Albania‘s weak institutional and 
governance capacity. This policy reform program is being supported by a Structural 
Adjustment Credit, which was approved by the Bank in June of 1999. The overall 
objective of the Public Administration Reform Project is to provide required resources for 
technical assistance, training, goods and incremental operating costs that are needed to 
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implement the Government‘s Institutional and Public Administration Reform agenda 
effectively.  The project will include a number of performance indicators, some of which 
are intended to serve more to focus the Government‘s attention on the longer term 
objectives of its reform effort, and others of which are intended to capture the more 
immediate and concrete progress that can reasonably be expected to be achieved during 
project implementation.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This project has approached the task of developing political acceptability and 
professional consensus on some quantitative measures of governance indicators 
cautiously.  If consensus is key to developing governance indicators that offer traction in 
institutional change, then careful testing of the water and sensitivity to the often justified 
concerns of governments is key to that consensus. 
 
With that in mind, the project has progressed in the following areas:  The DAC work to 
date on indicators of participatory democracy and good governance has been reviewed.  
The project has examined and drawn together potential governance indicators, both 
existing and new to identify the extent to which they meet each of several established 
criteria on quality and coverage of data, replicability and transparency, government 
ownership and acceptability, specificity with which particular institutions are implicated, 
and with some indicators, relevance to particular development outcomes.  Furthermore, 
major work within the World Bank regarding indicators that capture aspects of corruption 
have been studied and incorporated into the second generation indicators of governance 
project.  Use of the various governance indicators in operational work and research 
documents has also been tracked.   
 
Efforts to date have not yet drawn robust conclusions between all of the indicators and 
pro-poor development outcomes.  Work has progressed for some of the second 
generation indicators and some of the UN‘s pro-poor development outcomes.  Thus far 
the collection and pulling together of secondary data sources has been much more time 
intensive than was anticipated, slowing our progress in analyzing the data.   
 
The next steps in the project are to continue analysis of the data to determine the 
relevance of second generation indicators to pro-poor development outcomes, post 
additional indicators to the DAC website as they become available,  manage the website, 
and monitor feedback.   
 
On December 19
th
 2001, the World Bank's Governance and Public Sector Reform Group 
of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network hosted a workshop 
concerning progress made with the second generation governance indicators.  
Discussions at the workshop showed support for the cautious approach adopted by the 
Bank in testing indicators for inclusion in a ―second generation‖ dataset.  It was noted 
that the tenor of discussions on governance indicators has changed since the March 2000 
International Development Forum, and in particular that there is now considerable 
interest from developing countries in cooperating with the publication of governance 
indicators.  There is every prospect that some governance indicators will ultimately join 
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the United Nations‘ Millennium Development Goals.  The December 19th workshop has 
also raised the prospect that partner institutions may adopt our methodology in 
investigating  indicators of democratization, participatory government, and human rights.  
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